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Abstract
Theinteractionofmonetaryandﬁscalpoliciesisacrucialissueinahighlyintegratedeconomicarea
such as the European Union. This paper analyzes the design of monetary and ﬁscal policies in the
EMU. To do so, the paper starts with an overview of the most important aspects. Next, it analyzes
monetary and ﬁscal policy interaction in a stylized model of a monetary union, in which monetary
and ﬁscal policy design is modeled as a dynamic stabilization game. Macroeconomic policy making
and adjustment are studied under alternative forms of cooperation and in both symmetric and
asymmetric settings.
Introduction
The introduction of the Euro on January 1, 1999 completed the economic
policy architecture designed by the Maastricht Treaty on the Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU). The single monetary policy has been delegated to the
European Central Bank (ECB). The Governing Council of the ECB is charged
with the formulation of the single monetary policy and for setting the guide-
lines for policy implementation; its responsibilities include decisions relating to
intermediate monetary objectives, key interest rates, and the supply of reserves322 VAN AARLE ET AL.
in the Eurosystem. Each member of the Governing Council has one vote, and
monetarypolicydecisionsrequireonlyasimplemajority.TheGoverningCouncil
is composed of the governors of the national central banks which fully partici-
pate in EMU, and the members of the Executive Board. The Executive Board, in
turn, is composed of the President, the Vice-President, and four other members
and is mainly responsible for the implementation of monetary policy. In this role
it provides instructions to the twelve national central banks.
Responsibility for national budgetary policy and structural policies remains
with the Member States, subject to their obligations stemming from the Treaty
orfromsecondarylegislationsuchastheStabilityandGrowthPact.Wagesalso
continue to be negotiated nationally, according to the prevailing wage bargain-
ing arrangements. The design of an EMU with a highly independent monetary
authority and ﬁscal authorities that are subjected to ﬁscal restrictions in the
form of the Stability and Growth Pact, reﬂects the opinion that monetary and
ﬁscal policies need to be clearly laid down and constrained to avoid a danger
of ﬁscal proﬂigacy and an ECB that is governed by the political and/or national
interests of politicians.
With the move to EMU, participating Member States will take an increased
mutual interest in their economic performance: a high degree of economic in-
terdependence exists throughout the EMU as a result of the completion of the
Single Market. In addition, countries in the Euro-area now face the same mon-
etary policy conditions. Economic trends in any part of the currency area can
have a bearing on these conditions, and can therefore have an impact on the
other parts of the currency area. Under EMU, consequently, there is a strong
case for improved policy coordination. Policy coordination can contribute to
achieving an appropriate economic policy mix for the Euro-area as a whole
as well as for its constituents. This includes taking into account spill-over ef-
fectsandpossiblenegativeexternalitiesthatcouldoccurundernoncoordinated
decision-making; also, to avoid free rider behavior where policy-makers renege
on their own responsibilities and adopt a wait-and-see approach in an attempt
to beneﬁt from the efforts of others.
An elaborate policy coordination system has been designed for the EMU.
The annual Broad Economic Policy Guidelines of the Member States and the
community are the central element in this system. They give guidance to the
policy-makers at the national and community levels with regard to macroeco-
nomic and structural conditions. These guidelines seek to ensure consistency
in the policy stance across policy instruments and across countries and the
full use of available policy tools. General guidelines apply to the EU and the
Euro-area as a whole, and the country-speciﬁc guidelines address issues of
particular relevance for individual countries.
This paper has two related objectives: First, to provide a basic overview on
monetary and ﬁscal policy design in the EMU. It does not aim at reviewing all
aspects of monetary and ﬁscal policy design in the EMU and the associated
literature in depth (see European Commission (1997) for a very broad survey).MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY DESIGN IN THE EMU 323
Rather,itwantstoprovidethereaderwithagoodinsightonhowalloftheissues
ﬁt together, and what is making EMU such an intriguing institutional framework.
The second aim is to provide the reader with a nontechnical overview of a
research project that analyzed the interaction of monetary and ﬁscal policies in
the EMU using a dynamic game approach.1 In this approach, the monetary and
ﬁscal authorities interact strategically and implement optimal policies subject
to the adjustment dynamics of the EMU economy. A dynamic framework was
chosen as macroeconomic adjustment and macroeconomic stabilization are
inherentlyofadynamicnature.Astaticframeworkwouldnotallowustoaddress
issues of timing and dynamics in an appropriate way. This approach, in our
opinion, provides an insightful way of analyzing—admittedly, in a stylized way—
many aspects of monetary and ﬁscal policy design in the EMU. The analysis is
structuredasfollows:Section2reviewsthemostimportantaspectsofmonetary
and ﬁscal policy design in the EMU. Sections 3 through 5 present a dynamic
stabilization game between the monetary and ﬁscal policy-makers in the EMU.
2. Monetary and ﬁscal policy design in the EMU: An overview
of the main issues
This section summarizes three interdependent issues that have played a crucial
role in the discussions on EMU.
2.1. Design of monetary and ﬁscal policies
In the EMU, monetary policy has been delegated to a supra-national author-
ity, the ECB, with a complex framework of objectives, policy instruments, and
decision-making procedures. According to the Maastricht Treaty, the ECB
should safeguard price stability in the EMU, and subject to the condition that it
doesnotinterferewithpricestability,promoteeconomicgrowthintheEMU.The
ECB directs its policies, therefore, at controlling the economic developments of
the aggregate EMU economy. Price stability is to be maintained in the Euro-area
as whole. Aggregate price stability does not necessarily imply equal inﬂation
rates at any time in each and in every country composing the EMU area.
As noted in the introduction, ﬁscal and structural policies remain delegated to
the national level in the EMU as stipulated by the subsidiarity principle of the
EU Treaty.2 The design of ﬁscal policies in the EMU is complicated by the set
of constraints on national ﬁscal policies imposed by the Stability and Growth
Pact, according to which excessive deﬁcits are to be avoided and subject to
sanctions. The Stability and Growth Pact stipulates that Member States ad-
here to the medium-term objective of budgetary positions “close to balance or
in surplus.” This should allow them to keep the general government deﬁcit
below 3 percent of GDP in the face of “normal” cyclical ﬂuctuations with-
out resorting to pro-cyclical ﬁscal tightening. Subject to certain provisions,324 VAN AARLE ET AL.
including a waiver in the event of exceptionally severe recessions, pecuniary
sanctions can be applied if the deﬁcit threshold is crossed. Multilateral surveil-
lance is exercised through the annual submission to the Commission of
programs containing macroeconomic and ﬁscal projections showing how the
countries plan to achieve their medium-term objectives.
The Stability and Growth Pact seeks to address longer-term externalities re-
lated to persistent biases toward excessive deﬁcits, and to foster monetary
policy credibility. The Stability and Growth Pact does not, however, address the
issue of whether macroeconomic spillovers in EMU are important enough to ne-
cessitate additional coordination of policies. In part, it will depend on the nature
of the shock encountered. Large symmetric shocks are likely to require strong
coordination of policies—including monetary policy—in the EMU. If the shock
is country-speciﬁc, temporary, and does not impinge much on the Euro-area
aggregate, the appropriate instrument is national ﬁscal policy, and there may
be less need for coordination. If the shock has implications for Euro-area wide
inﬂation, the primary instrument should be monetary policy. Monetary policy
should also take into account the implications of the ﬁscal policy stance for
prospective price developments, especially if spillovers between monetary and
ﬁscal policies are signiﬁcant. This is more likely to be the case if large Euro-
area economies, or a number of small economies, simultaneously adjust ﬁscal
policy, since their actions may have enough impact on Euro-area wide activity
and inﬂation prospects to prompt a monetary policy response.
2.2. Asymmetries in policy preferences, sizes, and structures
Oneofthemostimportantdiscussions3 intheEMUconcernstheconsequences
of a common monetary policy in a setting with possible asymmetries in policy
preferences and structural characteristics, and if EMU is hit by symmetric and
asymmetric shocks in divergent macroeconomic conditions. The transmission
mechanisms of monetary policy for the area as a whole and for the individual
constituents are, moreover, quite uncertain. Asymmetries in structural charac-
teristics will lead to differences in the transmission of monetary and ﬁscal poli-
cies between the different EMU countries. There are several potential sources
of different regional responses to a common monetary policy. These include
differences in: the composition of output; the degree of openness; the level of
development and structure of the ﬁnancial market; sector balance sheet posi-
tions; and the ﬂexibility and institutional features of labor and product markets.
This aspect is likely to complicate macroeconomic policy design and coordi-
nation in the EMU to a signiﬁcant extent.
Another concern is the possibility that regional conditions could have an un-
warrantedinﬂuenceonpolicy.EvenintheUnitedStates,despitethehighdegree
of centralization of decision-making, there is some evidence that local condi-
tions have an inﬂuence on the votes of regional presidents. The Eurosystem is
even more vulnerable in this regard. The composition of the Governing CouncilMONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY DESIGN IN THE EMU 325
may carry the risk that heterogeneity of preferences about the output-inﬂation
trade-off could result in undue weight being placed on regional conditions.
This, in turn, could make for inefﬁcient choices in ECB policies. The pressures
may intensify if the transmission mechanisms differ signiﬁcantly across the
Euro-area.
2.3. Macroeconomic policy coordination
In the EMU, the dimension of policy coordination can be decomposed into two
elements.4 Firstly, the possibility of ﬁscal policy coordination arises. As noted
earlier,theEMUleavesﬁscalpolicydesignprincipallytotheindividualcountries
but sets a framework of ﬁscal constraints. It does not foresee the move to a ﬁs-
cal federation. In an integrated area like the EMU, individual ﬁscal policies have
important effects on the other countries through a variety of spillovers and ex-
ternalitiesingoods,labor,andﬁnancialmarketsintheEMUarea.Thismakesthe
possibility of ﬁscal coordination such an important aspect of macroeconomic
policy design in the EMU.
Coordination of ﬁscal policy has been strengthened considerably since the
early 1990s, as the Maastricht Treaty set deﬁcit and debt criteria to be re-
spected before a country could join the Euro-area, and the Stability and Growth
Pact made these more stringent. The institutional side of coordination has also
been enhanced with the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, the Stability and
Growth Pact, and the high-level EU policy groups such as Ecoﬁn (Economics
and Finance Ministers), the Economic and Financial Committee, and the Euro-
12 Group (a subgroup of the Ecoﬁn speciﬁc to EMU).5 The instrument of mul-
tilateral surveillance is used to reinforce the excessive deﬁcit procedure and
coordination of ﬁscal policies in the EMU area. The ECB also plays a role in this
procedure: it expresses its opinions about the stability programs and the broad
economic policy guidelines, and in the discussions about the achievement of
objectives and possible corrective measures that need to be taken.
Secondly, the possibility exists of monetary and ﬁscal policy coordination at
the aggregate EMU level to stabilize output and inﬂation ﬂuctuations in the EMU
economy and to limit regional divergences. This issue has received less atten-
tion than the ﬁscal policy coordination issue.6 Nevertheless, the coordination of
national ﬁscal policies with the common monetary policy of the ECB could be
an important aspect of EMU, given the existence of interdependencies due to
sizeable spillovers and externalities. Italianer (1999) and Bini Smaghi and Casini
(2000) review in detail the institutional framework in which policy coordination
between the ECB and the ECOFIN is situated. The EU Treaty and subsequent
European Council meetings emphasized the importance of the macroeconomic
dialogue to coordinate ﬁscal policy, monetary policy, and wage developments
in the EMU. The communication between the ECB and ECOFIN is formally ar-
ranged in the form of the presence of the President of ECOFIN in the meeting
of the Governing Council of the ECB, having the right to submit motions for326 VAN AARLE ET AL.
deliberation (but having no voting right). On its turn, the president of the ECB
participates in the ECOFIN Council meetings. Theoretical analyses by Levine
and Brociner (1994) and Hughes-Hallett and Ma (1996) have suggested that this
form of policy coordination is indeed relevant in the EMU context.
3. Monetary and ﬁscal policy design in the EMU:
An analytical framework
The previous section identiﬁed the issues of macroeconomic policy design,
asymmetries, and policy cooperation as distinguishing elements of the EMU.
These also have a crucial role in our theoretical analysis of macroeconomic
policy design in the EMU. Monetary and ﬁscal policy design in our analysis are
the outcome of a dynamic stabilization game in which the ECB and the national
ﬁscal authorities are engaged.
In this game, the ECB is concerned with inﬂation and real activity in the ag-
gregate EMU economy.7 Moreover, we consider interest rate smoothing as an
additional objective. The national ﬁscal authorities only care about inﬂation and
output in their own country. The Stability and Growth Pact is modeled as an ob-
jective of deﬁcit stabilization (or deﬁcit smoothing). Symmetric and asymmetric
settings and the effects on the transmissions of monetary and ﬁscal policies in
the EMU, have a prominent role in the analysis. The impact of these asymme-
tries under alternative policy regimes has also been given attention since the
consequences of asymmetries will partly depend on the policy regime in place.
Finally, the project has studied in detail alternative regimes of macroeconomic
policy cooperation and their effects in a dynamic model of macroeconomic pol-
icy making and adjustment in the EMU. Fiscal policy coordination in the EMU
has been given much attention. 8
The stylized EMU model developed in Engwerda et al. (1999, 2002) and van
Aarle et al. (2001b, c) is based on the original model of Turnovsky, Basar, and
d’Orey (1988) and Neck and Dockner (1995) on monetary policy making in a
two-country setting. It extends the model to a two-country monetary union and
adds also ﬁscal stabilization policy. The framework ignores the external inter-
action of the EMU countries with the non-EMU countries and also the dynamic
implications of government debt and net foreign asset accumulation. It consists
of the following equations:
y1(t) = δ1s(t) − γ1r1(t) + ρ1y2(t) + η1 f1(t), (1a)
y2(t) =− δ2s(t) − γ2r2(t) + ρ2y1(t) + η2 f2(t), (1b)
s(t) = p2(t) − p1(t), (2)
r1(t) = iE(t) − ˙ p1(t), (3a)
r2(t) = iE(t) − ˙ p2(t), (3b)
m1(t) − p1(t) = κ1y1(t) − λ1iE(t), (4a)MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY DESIGN IN THE EMU 327
m2(t) − p2(t) = κ2y2(t) − λ2iE(t), (4b)
˙ p1(t) = ξ1y1(t), (5a)
˙ p2(t) = ξ2y2(t), (5b)
in which y denotes real output, s competitiveness of country 2 vis-` a-vis country
1, r the real interest rate, p the price level, f the real ﬁscal deﬁcit, iE the nominal
interest rate and m nominal money balances. All variables are in logarithms,
except for the interest rate which is in perunages, and denote deviations from
their long-run equilibrium (balanced growth path) that has been normalized to
zero, for simplicity. A dot above a variable denotes its time derivative.
Equation (1) gives output in the EMU countries as a function of competi-
tiveness in intra-EMU trade, the real interest rate, the foreign output, and the
domestic ﬁscal deﬁcit. Competitiveness is deﬁned in (2) as the output price
differential. Real interest rates are deﬁned in (3) as the difference between the
EMU wide nominal interest rate, iE, and domestic inﬂation. Note that (3) implies
that,temporarily,realinterestratesdivergeamongcountriesifinﬂationratesare
different. (4) provides the demand for the common currency. (5) relates output
to inﬂation by a Phillips-curve type relation.
We assume that the ﬁscal authorities control their ﬁscal policy instrument
such as to minimize the following quadratic loss function which features





























in which θ denotes the rate of time preference and α,β, and χ represent pref-
erence weights that are attached to the stabilization of inﬂation, output, and
ﬁscal deﬁcits, respectively. Deﬁcits in the loss function may reﬂect the possi-
bility that excessive deﬁcits in the EMU will be subject to sanctions, as pro-
posed in the “Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure” of the Treaty of Maastricht on the
European Union (art. 104c) and its more recent extension into the Stability and
Growth Pact. Therefore, countries will prefer low ﬁscal deﬁcits to high deﬁcits.
Another way to formulate this is that the Stability and Growth Pact introduces
deﬁcit stabilization, or deﬁcit smoothing, as an explicit objective of ﬁscal policy
design.
As stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty, the ECB directs the common monetary
policy at stabilizing inﬂation and, as long as not in contradiction to inﬂation
stabilization, stabilizing output in the aggregate EMU economy.9 It is assumed
that the ECB operates an interest rate targeting strategy.10 Moreover, we will
assume that the active use of monetary policy implies costs for the monetary
policy-maker: other things equal, it would like to keep its policy instrument
constant, avoiding large swings. Such an interest rate smoothing objective in328 VAN AARLE ET AL.
the preferences of the monetary authority is currently receiving more attention
in monetary policy analysis (see Sack (2000)). Consequently, we assume that















where pE(t):=ωp1(t) + (1 − ω)p2(t) and yE(t):=ωy1(t) + (1 − ω)y2(t), in which ω
and 1−ω denote the relative sizes of the economies of country 1 and country 2
in the aggregate EMU economy. The model (1–5) can be reduced to two output
equations:




y2(t) =− b2s(t) − c2iE(t) +
ρ2
k2













k1k2−ρ1ρ2,k1 := 1 − γ1ξ1 and k2 :=1−γ2ξ2. The dynamics of the model can then be
written as a linear differential equation with competitiveness, s(t), as the scalar
state variable, the national ﬁscal deﬁcits, fi(t),i ={1,2}, and the common inter-
est rate, iE(t), as control variables:
˙ s(t)=−φ1 f1(t) + φ2 f2(t) + φ3iE(t) + φ4s(t) s(0)=:s0, (9)
in which φ1 :=(ξ1 − ξ2
ρ2
k2)a1,φ 2 :=(ξ2 − ξ1
ρ1
k1)a2,φ 3 :=ξ1c1 − ξ2c2 and φ4 :=−(ξ1b1 +
ξ2b2).Theinitialvalueofthestatevariable,s0,measuresanyinitialdisequilibrium
in intra-EMU competitiveness. Such an initial disequilibrium in competitiveness
could be the result of differences in ﬁscal policies in the past or some initial
asymmetric shock in the EMU.
4. Macroeconomic policy design and coordination in the EMU:
Alternative policy regimes
This project has focused on analyzing outcomes under alternative modes of
policy cooperation in the EMU. We have analyzed macroeconomic policy de-
sign and macroeconomic adjustment in three alternative macroeconomic pol-
icy regimes: (i) noncooperative monetary and ﬁscal policies, (ii) full cooperation,
and (iii) partial cooperation.
(i) The noncooperative case (N): in the noncooperative case, players mini-
mize their cost functions (6a), (6b) and (7) subject to the dynamic law of motion
(9) of the system, assuming Nash open-loop strategies. (ii) The cooperative
case (C): in the full cooperation case, players minimize a common cost func-
tion: JC =τC
1 J1 + τC
2 J2 + τC
E JE subject to (9); τC equals the bargaining power
of the players with τC
1 + τC
2 + τC
E =1. (iii) Cases with coalitions of policy-makersMONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY DESIGN IN THE EMU 329
((1,2),(1, E),(2, E)): with a set of more than two macroeconomic policy-makers,
possibilities exist for the formation of coalitions of policy-makers that cooper-
ate between themselves and interact noncooperatively with non-members of
the coalition. Particularly in a monetary union consisting of different countries
with one common monetary authority, it seems an interesting case to explore
such coalition formation in more detail. (a) Coalition (1,2) with cost functions:
J(1,2) =τ
(1,2)
1 J1 + τ
(1,2)




2 =1. This case of ﬁscal coop-
eration has received much attention in the context of EMU. Fiscal cooperation
can take many practical forms in the EMU context: from cooperation on an ad
hoc basis up to the formation of a fully ﬂedged federal ﬁscal authority. Since the
EMU is currently far from a ﬁscal federation, the ﬁrst interpretation here of ﬁscal
cooperation is more realistic and preferred here. (b) Coalition (1, E) with cost
functions: J(1,E) =τ
(1,E)
1 J1 + τ
(1,E)




E =1. In this case,
country 1 and the ECB form a coalition which interacts noncooperatively with









E =1. Here, country 2 and the ECB coordinate their policies
and act in a noncooperative fashion against country 1.
Inallcases,asshownindetailinvanAarleetal.(2001b),theoptimalstrategies
that result in this open-loop linear-quadratic (LQ) differential game are a linear









 = His(t) i ={N,C,(1,2),(1, E),(2, E)}, (10)
in which H is a 3 by 1 vector with feedback coefﬁcients. Furthermore, the result-
ing closed-form solution is described by the differential equation s(t)=−acl,is(t)
with s(0):=s0, where acl,i is the adjustment speed of the closed-loop system in
case of equilibrium i.
Wehavenotedbeforethatsymmetriesandasymmetriesbetweencountriesin
terms of policy preferences, structural parameters (which reﬂect the underlying
institutionsinthegoods,labor,andﬁnancialmarkets)andsizeareadetermining
feature of the EMU. In order to have a good understanding of the effects of
asymmetries between participating countries, it is essential to understand the
workingsofmacroeconomicpoliciesinasymmetricEMU.Therefore,theproject
has investigated intensively the symmetric case in order to use it as a reference
point in the analysis of various asymmetries and their consequences. In the
symmetric case, all structural and preference parameters are equal in country 1
and country 2, and both countries are of equal size and have equal bargaining
weight in a coalition.
In Engwerda et al. (2002) and van Aarle et al. (2001b), we derived a number
of analytical properties of the noncooperative, the cooperative, and the ﬁscal
coalition equilibria of the symmetric case. Firstly, w.r.t. the number of equilibria
that may appear in the game, one ﬁnds that in the cooperative and the ﬁscal330 VAN AARLE ET AL.
coalition case the game has always a unique equilibrium. If k >ρ (a condition
saying that openness should not be too large and which is likely to hold in most
cases) the noncooperative game also has a unique equilibrium. If k ≤ρ the
number of equilibria may vary between zero and two. In the remainder of the
paper, we will restrict to the case that the noncooperative game has a uniquely
deﬁned equilibrium.
Secondly, in the symmetric case we observe in the noncooperative, the co-
operative, and the ﬁscal coalition case that f1(t)=−f2(t) and that the ECB does
not inﬂuence the game, neither in a direct way (i.e., iE(t)=0) nor in an indirect
way (i.e., via its parameters) in the symmetric case. These statements do not
hold for the case of a coalition between the ECB and one ﬁscal player. There,
the ﬁscal instruments differ and the ECB uses its instruments actively to reach
its goals. The symmetry assumptions are crucial too, if they are dropped the
ECB gets also actively involved into the game also in the noncooperative, the
cooperative, and the ﬁscal coalition case.
Some further general conclusions for the symmetric case can be derived. It
can be shown that the convergence speeds of the cooperative case and the
ﬁscal cooperation case are equal and higher than that of the noncooperative
case, and that the adjustment speed is a monotonically increasing function of
the ﬁscal stringency parameter χ. With respect to the performance criteria we
showed that the costs for the ﬁscal players are the same in the cooperative
case and the ﬁscal coalition case and that these costs are lower than in the
noncooperative case. The ECB is indifferent between the three different cases
in this symmetry EMU. In other words, it has little to gain from coordination
of its monetary policy with the national ﬁscal policies in (close to) symmetric
settings.
5. A simulation analysis
Inthissectionweconsiderthedifferentialgameonmacroeconomicstabilization
in the EMU that was set up in Sections 3 and 4, using scenarios of a stylized
example. We analyze three different simulations. A symmetric base scenario is
analyzed ﬁrst. Next, a situation with asymmetric transmission of ﬁscal policy
in both countries is analyzed. Finally, we assume that the countries differ w.r.t.
the short-run output-inﬂation trade-off. Outcomes are analyzed for all the ﬁve
different equilibria outlined in Section 3: the noncooperative equilibrium, the
fully cooperative equilibrium, and the partial cooperative equilibria (the ﬁscal
coalition and the coalitions between the ECB and a ﬁscal player).
In order to obtain some insight into the question which coalitions may arise
and which are less plausible, we introduce some terminology. Each of the ﬁve
policy regimes outlined in the above subsections is called a coalition form and
each group of two or more players that cooperate in a coalition form a coalition.
We say that a certain coalition form is supported by player i, if player i has no
incentive to deviate from this coalition form. We say that this coalition form isMONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY DESIGN IN THE EMU 331
internally supported if all players in the coalition support the coalition form.11 If
a coalition form is internally supported, then we will call this coalition form sus-
tainable, that is, in such a coalition form no player has an incentive to deviate
and leave this coalition form. Finally, we call a coalition form unsustainable if
one or more players has/have an incentive to deviate from this coalition form.
In that case, players inside and outside the coalition can improve by joining
another coalition form. Note that a coalition form which is not internally sup-
ported is in principle not viable. Reasons why such a coalition form could still
take place are the possibility that side-payments take place or that some other
institutional arrangement is in place that could secure the existence of other-
wise not sustainable coalitions. Side-payments and institutional arrangements
could therefore allow for a broad range of coalitions to be supported.
5.1. A reference point: Policy design in a symmetric EMU
In this ﬁrst example, a starting point is a situation where countries are symmet-
ric. In the symmetric baseline case, the countries are equally weighted in the
ECB’s loss function and the following values for the structural model param-
eters are used12: γ =0.4,δ=0.2,ρ=0.4,η=1 and ξ =0.25.13 The initial state of
the monetary union economy is s0 =0.05 (implying an initial disequilibrium of
5% in competitiveness between the two countries). Concerning the preference
weights in the objective functions of the ﬁscal players, the following values
have been assumed: α =2,β=5,χ=2.5 and θ =0.15. It is assumed that the
ECB cares relatively more about inﬂation than output: αE =2.5,βE =1,χE =2.5.
The countries are equally sized, ω=0.5, and the following symmetric bargain-
ing powers in the coalitions are set: τC ={1/3,1/3,1/3},τ(1,2) ={1/2,1/2),τ(1,E) =
{1/2,1/2}, and τ(2,E) ={1/2,1/2}.
Figure 1 displays the adjustment in this symmetric base case. As noted at
the end of Section 4, the cooperative and the ﬁscal coalition equilibria coincide
in the symmetric case. The initial disequilibrium in intra-EMU competitiveness
implies that output is initially above the long-run equilibrium in country 1 and
below the long-run equilibrium in country 2. This initial condition together with
the monetary and ﬁscal policy reactions leads to the observed adjustment pat-
terns. The adjustment of intra-EMU competitiveness is given in panel (a). The
adjustments of the policy variables are found in panels (b) through (d). In the
noncooperative case, the cooperative case, and the ﬁscal coalition case we
ﬁnd the behavior noted already in Section 4 that the ECB has no active policy
and that the ﬁscal policy reactions in both countries are exactly opposite. The
common interest rate, panel (b), only reacts in the case of a coalition with one
ﬁscal policy-maker. In that case, the common interest rate is partly targeted
at the situation in the country with which the ECB has formed a coalition. This
leads to a higher interest rate in case a coalition is formed with country 1, and
a lower interest rate when a coalition is formed with country 2. This helps ad-
justment in the country with which the ECB forms a coalition, but increases332 VAN AARLE ET AL.


















































































































Figure 1. Symmetric base case. – Nash, --- Pareto, .... (1,2),–-–(1, E) and -- · --(2, E).MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY DESIGN IN THE EMU 333
Table 1. Costs and adjustment speeds.
Nash (N) Pareto (C) (1,2) (1, E)( 2 , E)
5.1 Symmetric EMU
J1 0.3596 0.3032 0.3032 0.4145 2.4911
J2 0.3596 0.3032 0.3032 2.4911 0.4145
JE 0 0 0 0.0088 0.0088
acl 0.1007 0.1162 0.1162 0.0933 0.0933
5.2 Asymmetric ﬁscal transmission
J1 0.2950 0.3619 0.2925 0.3395 3.4711
J2 0.6201 0.2951 0.4736 3.5548 0.2541
JE 0.0060 0.0397 0.0009 0.0125 0.2085
acl 0.1094 0.1219 0.1278 0.1048 0.0950
5.3 Asymmetric rigidities
J1 0.4169 0.4110 0.3959 1.7418 2.3249
J2 0.4449 0.3323 0.3512 11.401 0.4226
JE 0.0019 0.0047 0.0053 0.0406 0.0037
acl 0.0933 0.1053 0.1053 0.0627 0.0930
the adjustment burden for the other country. Panels (e) and (f) display output
in country 1 and 2 in the different cases. In the cooperative case and the ﬁscal
coalition case, ﬁscal policy activism is lower than in the noncooperative case,
because higher ﬁscal policy activism in one country has negative spillovers on
the adjustment burden of the other country. In these cases, such policy exter-
nalities from individual ﬁscal policies are internalized when designing optimal
ﬁscal stabilization strategies for the entire EMU.
In Table 1, the resulting losses in the ﬁve different cases of this symmetric
baseline case are given.
In this symmetric case, the properties noted in Section 4 concerning the
adjustment speed can be directly veriﬁed: the adjustment speed (measured by
thesizeoftheacl’s)isfastestunderﬁscalcooperationandtheParetocase.Also,
it is seen that the coalitions of one ﬁscal policy-maker and the ECB have the
slowest adjustment speed, a feature that will reappear in other simulations as
well, although we did not establish it as a general result in Section 4, because
the expressions in these cases of one ﬁscal player and the ECB forming a
coalition are complicated. In that sense, these coalitions tend to inefﬁciencies,
and in particular to place a large adjustment burden on the ﬁscal player that is
held outside the coalition. Moreover, the ﬁscal coalition is internally supported.
From the analysis in the previous section, we know that the losses in the Pareto
case and the ﬁscal coalition form coincide. Both are sustainable in this case,
whereas the coalitions (1, E) and (2, E) are unsustainable as both the ECB and
the ﬁscal players would rather leave the arrangement and even prefer the Nash
equilibrium than to remain in such a coalition.334 VAN AARLE ET AL.
5.2. Asymmetric ﬁscal policy transmissions in the EMU
In the second simulation, we analyze a situation where the ﬁscal policy is trans-
mitted differently in both countries. It is assumed that the elasticity of output
w.r.t. ﬁscal policy is lower in country 2 than in country 1: η1 =1 and η2 =0.6. All
other parameters are the same as in the baseline case. Figure 2 displays the
adjustment in this case.
In this asymmetric setting, the adjustment and policy strategies are no longer
perfectly (anti-) symmetric in both countries and the Pareto and ﬁscal coalition
case no longer coincide. In particular, the reduced effectiveness of its instru-
ment implies an increased adjustment burden for country 2, as witness signif-
icantly larger output losses, higher deﬁcits, and slower adjustment compared
to the base case. On the other hand, the slower adjustment of country 2 implies
faster adjustment for country 1 in the Nash case. In the cooperative case and
ﬁscal coalition case it shares in the increased adjustment burden of country 2
by running smaller ﬁscal surpluses which retard the adjustment of its own high
output, but thereby helps in stabilizing the economy of country 2. The ECB now
reacts in all strategic settings as its objective functions imply that its optimal
strategy instrument is sensitive to asymmetries in the EMU area. Interest rates
are reduced—with the only exception of the case where it forms a coalition with
country 1—to support the adjustment in country 2. Table 1 gives the resulting
welfare losses and the adjustment speeds in the different cases.
The ﬁscal authority of country 1 and the ECB have a ﬁscal coalition as their
most preferred outcome. The fully cooperative case is unsustainable since
country 1 and the ECB would still prefer a coalition between themselves or
even the noncooperative case. Country 2 prefers a coalition with the ECB; how-
ever, that is not likely to be sustainable. Country 2 would, on the other hand,
still prefer the ﬁscal coalition to the noncooperative equilibrium. The highest
adjustment speed is also obtained in this ﬁscal coalition case.
5.3. An asymmetry in the degree of nominal rigidities
In this example, we analyze the consequences of differences in the extent
of nominal rigidities in both countries. The existence of nominal rigidities is
reﬂected in the parameter ξ. Amongst other things, nominal rigidities affect the
transmission of ﬁscal policy and monetary policy and ξ is therefore one of the
crucial parameters of the model. In this example, we assume that country 2
is now characterized by more nominal rigidities than country 1, ξ1 =0.25 and
ξ2 =0.15. All other parameters are the same as in the baseline case. The adjust-
ment under this scenario provides Figure 3.
Optimal policies and adjustment are much different from the baseline case.
With its economy displaying larger nominal rigidities, country 2 faces higher
adjustment burdens and it chooses a stronger stabilization policy compared to
the baseline case and this for all different equilibria. The slower adjustment inMONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY DESIGN IN THE EMU 335














































































































Figure 2. Asymmetric ﬁscal transmission, η1 =1,η 2 =0.6. – Nash, --- Pareto, .... (1,2),–-–(1, E)
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Figure 3. Asymmetric nominal rigidities, ξ1 =0.25,ξ 2 =0.15. – Nash, --- Pareto, .... (1,2),–-–(1, E)
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country 2 beneﬁts to some extent the adjustment of country 1: its adjustment
need is somewhat reduced. A peculiar case is the coalition of country 1 and the
ECB, where a high interest rate and a high ﬁscal surplus in country 1 reduce
output in country 1 below the long-run equilibrium, despite the initial competi-
tive advantage. Country 2 suffers signiﬁcantly from this combination of a high
interestratepolicysetbytheECBandlowoutputincountry1,asalsothelosses
in Table 1 clearly indicate. Note also the very low adjustment speed under this
coalition.Country2prefersthecooperativecasebecausethereisahigherneed
for adjustment in country 2 and in this case this need can be internalized into
the monetary policy strategy of the ECB and the ﬁscal strategy of country 1.
For country 1 and the ECB the most preferred equilibria are the ﬁscal coalition
and the noncooperative case, respectively.
Conclusion
The establishment of the EMU has raised much interest to issues of monetary
and ﬁscal policy design in such an arrangement. Prominent are issues of sym-
metry of the participating countries and the role of policy coordination since
individual policies are likely to have signiﬁcant spillovers in a highly integrated
economic area such as the Euro-area. It is to be expected that EMU, by intro-
ducing a common monetary policy and restrictions on national ﬁscal policies,
is likely to increase the need for macroeconomic policy cooperation. However,
it is far from obvious that more policy cooperation will automatically be forth-
coming, or if it does, in the most preferred form. In particular, asymmetries in
policy preferences and structural conditions are likely to prevail in the EMU,
thereby complicating the process of macroeconomic policy cooperation to a
considerable extent.
This paper has surveyed the most important aspects of monetary and ﬁs-
cal policy design in the EMU. In addition, the interaction between the ECB
and national ﬁscal authorities was modeled as a dynamic game of macroeco-
nomic stabilization in the EMU. Using numerical examples, we illustrated the
complex effects that are produced by the various forms of policy coopera-
tion. Moreover, the sustainability of a certain type of coalition and the implica-
tions for the optimal strategies and the resulting macroeconomic adjustment,
was seen to be inﬂuenced by initial settings of preferences and the structural
model parameters. We found that the cooperation is often efﬁcient for the ﬁs-
cal players and that the ﬁscal players’ cooperation (against the ECB) leads to
a Pareto improvement for them. On the other hand, in many simulations full
cooperation does not induce a Pareto improvement for the ECB, while the gov-
ernments’ coalitions imply a considerable loss for the ECB compared to the
noncooperative and fully cooperative cases. Asymmetries can drastically in-
ﬂuence the outcomes under EMU, as the simulation exercises demonstrated.
Futureresearchonthesensitivityofoutcomestothevaluesofthevariousmodel
parameters could be useful. Further, the effects of adding more countries or338 VAN AARLE ET AL.
using alternative solution concepts of the dynamic stabilization game should be
investigated.
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Notes
1. The reader interested in all technical details is referred to Engwerda et al. (1999, 2002) and van
Aarle et al. (2001a, b, c).
2. An important aspect of ﬁscal policy in the EMU is the fact that ﬁscal relations within the EU
differ considerably from those in fully-ﬂedged federations: notwithstanding certain tendencies
towards more ﬁscal harmonization and ﬁscal federalism, ﬁscal policy design remains predomi-
nantly a national competence in the EMU. The Community’s budget is very small relative to that
of the member States and is not undertaking any stabilization function. It is frequently argued
that a federal ﬁscal structure which allows centralized stabilization is an important concomitant
of monetary union, and that Europe may be at a severe disadvantage in its absence.
3. See De Grauwe (2000), Hughes-Hallett and Piscitelli (1999), and Gros and Hefeker (2000) on the
asymmetric transmission of a common monetary policy. The issue of EMU-wide vs. individual
country variables inﬂuencing monetary policy making of the ECB is analysed in von Hagen and
Suppel (1994).
4. Policy coordination and policy cooperation are used as interchangeable concepts in the paper.
In a stylized interpretation, a monetary union could be considered as an institutional framework
to implement monetary policy cooperation between countries by delegating the design of mon-
etary policy to a supranational monetary authority. In the context of EMU, external coordination
of macroeconomic policies with non-EMU countries could be a relevant issue. In theoretical
and practical policy analysis this aspect has, however, not received so much interest so far.
5. In several other areas there are also specialized procedures for detailed policy coordination.
These procedures are concerned with advancing the process of structural reform in labor, prod-
uct,andcapitalmarkets(thes.c.LuxembourgandCardiffprocesses).InJune1999,theCologne
European Council initiated the Macroeconomic Dialog. It brings together both policy-makers
and representatives of the social partners for an exchange of views on economic developments
and prospects so as to foster a greater understanding of the policy requirements implied by
EMU.
6. Quite some literature has been devoted to the effects of ﬁscal coordination and ﬁscal-monetary
coordination on incentive structures in the EMU, using static Barro-Gordon type approaches,
see Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998), Beetsma and Uhlig (1999), and Dixit and Lambertini (2000).
Such issues are not addressed in our project, which concentrates entirely on a dynamic setting
of monetary and ﬁscal stabilization policies in the EMU.
7. In van Aarle et al. (2001b) we have also experimented with an objective function of the ECB
that is more sensitive to conditions in individual countries. It is shown that this will distort the
monetary policy of the ECB towards conditions in individual countries, in particular if large
asymmetries exist between countries.MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY DESIGN IN THE EMU 339
8. In particular, we focused on the possible effects of the Stability and Growth Pact and asym-
metric settings on ﬁscal coordination in the EMU. In Engwerda et al. (1999) the effects of non-
cooperative macroeconomic policies in the EMU have been analyzed. Fiscal cooperation has
been analyzed in Engwerda et al. (2002). van Aarle et al. (2001b, c) analyze macroeconomic
adjustment under noncooperative, partial cooperation, and full cooperation.
9. The ECB enjoys a very high degree of formal independence, with the Maastricht Treaty requiring
that the Central bank be free of political control over monetary policy. The Maastricht Treaty
makes the ECB accountable to European institutions, but not to national parliaments. The ECB
aims at maintaining price stability and—provided that it does not interfere with the price stability
objective—to foster economic growth in the Euro-area as a whole. Price stability was deﬁned in
1998 as a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices for the Euro-area
of below 2 percent. In late 1998, the Governing Council of the ECB agreed on a quantitative ref-
erence value for monetary growth and the deﬁnition of the monetary aggregate. The Governing
Council decided to set the reference value of M3 growth at 4.5 percent per annum.
10. An important question concerns the (mix of) policy instruments operated by the ECB. In the
monetary targeting case, the common money supply, mE(t):=ωm1(t)+(1 − ω)m2(t), is exoge-
nous and the policy instrument of the ECB. The common interest rate then clears the common
money market. In the interest targeting case, the common interest rate is the policy instrument
of the ECB and the common money market is cleared by adjustments in the money supply. In
Engwerda et al. (1999) and van Aarle et al. (2001a) the ECB implements a monetary targeting
strategy, whereas in van Aarle et al. (2001b, c) the ECB adopts an interest rate targeting strategy.
11. In addition, we could consider a concept of external support. A coalition form can be called
externally supported if all players outside the coalition support the coalition form. If a coalition
form is not externally supported, players outside a coalition have an incentive to engage in
alternative coalitions with members inside the current coalition.
12. See Engwerda et al. (2002) for a similar simulation set up.
13. The parameters κ and λ of the money demand functions only become important in case
monetary targeting policies would be implemented by the ECB.
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